12.30.06
Chomsky on Iraq
From Rad Green
Iraq: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Albert Interviews Chomsky
—–
Fundamental doctrine of Western intellectual culture: “State power has noble
objectives, and while it may make terrible blunders, it can have no crass
motives and is not influenced by domestic concentrations of private power.”—–
1. Why did the U.S. invade Iraq? (And why did important sectors of the
political elite, like Scowcroft, oppose doing so?) What are the U.S.motives
for staying?The official reason was what Bush, Powell, and others called “the single
question”: will Saddam end his development of Weapons of Mass Destruction?
The official Presidential Directive states the primary goal as to: “Free
Iraq in order to eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, their means of
delivery and associated programs, to prevent Iraq from breaking out of
containment and becoming a more dangerous threat to the region and beyond.”
That was the basis for congressional support for the invasion. The Directive
goes on with the goal of cutting “Iraqi links to and sponsorship of
international terrorism,” etc. A few phrases are thrown in from the standard
boilerplate about freedom that accompanies every action, and is close to a
historical universal, hence dismissed as meaningless by reasonable people,
but there to be dredged up by the doctrinal system when needed.When the “single question” was answered the wrong way, and the claims about
international terrorism became too much of an embarrassment to repeat
(though not for Cheney and a few others), the goal was changed to “democracy
promotion.” The media and journals, along with almost all scholarship,
quickly jumped on that bandwagon, relieved to discover that this is the most
“noble war” in history, pursuing Bush’s “messianic mission” to bring freedom
and democracy to the world. Some Iraqis agreed: 1% in a poll in Baghdad just
as the noble vision was declared in Washington. In the West, in contrast, it
doesn’t matter that there is a mountain of evidence refuting the claim, and
even apart from the timing — which should elicit ridicule — the evidence
for the “mission” is that our Dear Leader so declared. I’ve reviewed the
disgraceful record in print. It continues with scarcely a break to the
present, so consistently that I’ve stopped collecting the absurd repetitions
of the dogma.The real reason for the invasion, surely, is that Iraq has the second
largest oil reserves in the world, very cheap to exploit, and lies right at
the heart of the world’s major hydrocarbon resources, what the State
Department 60 years ago described as “a stupendous source of strategic
power.” The issue is not access, but rather control (and for the energy
corporations, profit). Control over these resources gives the US “critical
leverage” over industrial rivals, to borrow Zbigniew Brezinski’s phrase,
echoing George Kennan when he was a leading planner and recognized that such
control would give the US “veto power” over others. Dick Cheney observed
that control over energy resources provides “tools of intimidation or
blackmail” — when in the hands of others, that is. We are too pure and
noble for those considerations to apply to us, so true believers declare –
or more accurately, just presuppose, taking the point to be too obvious to
articulate.There was unprecedented elite condemnation of the plans to invade Iraq, even
articles in the major foreign policy journals, a publication of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and others. Sensible analysts were able to
perceive that the enterprise carried significant risks for US interests,
however conceived. Global opposition was utterly overwhelming, and the
likely costs to the US were apparent, though the catastrophe created by the
invasion went far beyond anyone’s worst expectations. It’s amusing to watch
the lying as the strongest supporters of the war try to deny what they very
clearly said. There is a good review of the “mendacity” of neocon
intellectuals (Ledeen, Krauthammer, and others) in The American
Conservative, Jan. 07. But they are not alone.On the US motives for staying, I can only repeat what I’ve been writing for
years. A sovereign Iraq, partially democratic, could well be a disaster for
US planners. With a Shi’ite majority, it is likely to continue improving
relations with Iran. There is a Shi’ite population right across the border
in Saudi Arabia, bitterly oppressed by the US-backed tyranny. Any step
towards sovereignty in Iraq encourages activism there for human rights and a
degree of autonomy — and that happens to be where most of Saudi oil is.
Sovereignty in Iraq might well lead to a loose Shi’ite alliance controlling
most of the world’s hydrocarbon resources and independent of the US,
undermining a primary goal of US foreign policy since it became the
world-dominant power after World War II. Worse yet, though the US can
intimidate Europe, it cannot intimidate China, which blithely goes its own
way, even in Saudi Arabia, the jewel in the crown — the primary reason why
China is considered a leading threat. An independent energy bloc in the Gulf
area is likely to link up with the China-based Asian Energy Security Grid
and Shanghai Cooperation Council, with Russia (which has its own huge
resources) as an integral part, along with the Central Asian states (already
members), possibly India. Iran is already associated with them, and a
Shi’ite dominated bloc in the Arab states might well go along. All of that
would be a nightmare for US planners, and its Western allies.There are, then, very powerful reasons why the US-UK are likely to try in
every possible way to maintain effective control over Iraq. The US is not
constructing a palatial Embassy, by far the largest in the world and
virtually a separate city within Baghdad, and pouring money into military
bases, with the intention of leaving Iraq to Iraqis. All of this is quite
separate from the expectations that matters can be arranged so that US
corporations profit from the vast riches of Iraq.These topics, though surely high on the agenda of planners, are not within
the realm of discussion, as can easily be determined. That is only to be
expected. These considerations violate the fundamental doctrine that state
power has noble objectives, and while it may make terrible blunders, it can
have no crass motives and is not influenced by domestic concentrations of
private power. Any questioning of these Higher Truths is either ignored or
bitterly denounced, also for good reasons: allowing them to be discussed
could undermine power and privilege. I don’t, incidentally, suggest that
commentators have much awareness of this. In our society, intellectual
elites are deeply indoctrinated, a point that Orwell noted in his
(unpublished) introduction to Animal Farm on how self-censorship works in
free societies. A large part of the reason, he plausibly concluded, is a
good education, which instills the understanding that there are certain
things “it wouldn’t do to say” — or more accurately, even to think.2. What, from the elite perspective, would be a major victory in Iraq, what
would be modest but still sufficient success, and what would constitute a
loss? More, for completeness, how much does democracy in Iraq, democracy in
the U.S., the well being of people in Iraq, or the well being of people in
the U.S. - or even of our soldiers - enter into the motivations of U.S.
policy?A major victory would be establishing an obedient client state, as
elsewhere. A modest success would be preventing a degree of sovereignty that
might allow Iraq to pursue the rather natural course I just described. As
for democracy, even the most dedicated scholar/advocates of “democracy
promotion” recognize that there is a “strong line of continuity” in US
efforts to promote democracy going back as far as you like and reaching the
present: democracy is supported if and only if it conforms to strategic and
economic objectives, so that all presidents are “schizophrenic,” a strange
puzzle (Thomas Carothers). That is so obvious that it takes really
impressive discipline to miss it. It is a remarkable feature of US (in fact
Western) intellectual culture that each well-indoctrinated mind can
simultaneously lavish praise on our awesome dedication to democracy while at
the same moment demonstrating utter contempt and hatred for democracy. For
example, supporting the brutal punishment of people who committed the crime
of voting “the wrong way” in a free election, as in Palestine right now,
with pretexts that would inspire ridicule in a free society. As for
democracy in the US, elite opinion has generally considered it a dangerous
threat, which must be resisted. The well-being of US soldiers is a concern,
though not a primary one. As for the well-being of the population here, it
suffices to look at domestic policies. Of course, these matters cannot be
completely ignored, even in totalitarian dictatorships, surely not in
societies where popular struggle has won considerable freedom.3. Why has the occupation been such a disaster, again, from the elite
perspective? Would more troops have helped initially? Was it wrong to
disband the army and order de-Baathification? If these or other policies
were mistakes, why were the mistakes made? Why are calls to withdraw coming
not only from sincere antiwar opposition, but also from elites with self
serving agendas? Are the latter just rhetoric? Do they indicate real
differences?There is plenty of elite commentary about the reasons for the disaster,
which has few historical counterparts. It’s worth bearing in mind that the
Nazis had far less trouble running occupied Europe — with civilians in
charge of administration and security for the most part –than the US is
having in Iraq. And Germany was at war. The same was true of the Russians in
Eastern Europe, and there are many other examples, in US history too. The
primary reason for the catastrophe, it is now generally agreed, is what I
was told (and wrote about) a few months after the invasion by a high-ranking
figure in one of the leading relief organizations, with rich experience in
some of the most awful parts of the world. He had just returned from failed
efforts at reconstruction in Baghdad, and told me that he had never seen
such a display of “arrogance, incompetence, and ignorance.” The specific
blunders are the topic of an extensive literature. I have nothing particular
to add, and frankly, the topic doesn’t interest me much, any more than
Russia’s tactical mistakes in Afghanistan, Hitler’s error of fighting a
two-front war, etc.On withdrawal proposals from elite circles, I think one should be cautious.
Some may be so deeply indoctrinated that they cannot allow themselves to
think about the reasons for the invasion or the insistence on maintaining
the occupation, in one or another form. Others may have in mind more
effective techniques of control by redeploying US military forces in bases
in Iraq and in the region, making sure to control logistics and support for
client forces in Iraq, air power in the style of the destruction of much of
Indochina after the business community turned against the war, and so on.4. What has been the impact of the anti-war movement on policy and
policymakers? Would choices by elites have been different if there were no
antiwar activity? When compared with the Vietnam era, this war seems to have
much more at stake, yet elite support is wobbling quicker and more deeply
than it did with Vietnam. The opposition is less militant and passionate
now, though arguably wider in its reach. What is your take on these matters?It’s hard to make an informed judgment about the impact on policy. In the
case of Indochina, there is an internal record; for Iraq there is not, so it
is a much more subjective judgment.On the rest, I think we have to be careful in comparing the two wars. They
are very different in character, and conditions have changed greatly. The
Indochina wars began shortly after World War II, when the Truman
administration decided to support France’s effort to reconquer its former
colony. The US then blocked a diplomatic settlement and established a brutal
and corrupt client state in South Vietnam, which elicited resistance that it
could not control, even after killing tens of thousands of people. By 1961,
the JFK administration decided to attack directly. Within a few years South
Vietnam was devastated, and by 1965, the LBJ administration expanded the war
to the North in the hope that Hanoi would pressure the South Vietnamese
resistance to desist, also sending hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy
SVN. Through all this long period, there was virtually no protest, so little
that few even know that Kennedy attacked SVN outright in 1962. The war was
unpopular, so much so that Kennedy planners tried to find some way to reduce
the US role, but only — as Kennedy insisted to the end — after victory. As
late as October 1965, the first major public demonstration against the war,
in liberal Boston, was broken up by counter-demonstrators, with the strong
support of the liberal media. By then the war against Vietnam had proceeded
far beyond the invasion of Iraq in scale and violence. Iraq is consumed by
violence today, but it is radically different from Indochina, where the US
was fighting an murderous war against the general population, who supported
the indigenous South Vietnamese resistance, as US experts knew very well,
and reported, sometimes even publicly. Very belatedly, a significant
anti-war movement developed, by 1967-8, including direct resistance to the
war, but it’s worth remembering how long it was delayed, and how much more
horrendous US actions were in Vietnam than in Iraq, by the time it did
develop. And even at its peak, the anti-war movement mostly focused on the
bombing of the North, and elite opposition was mostly limited to that,
because of the threats posed to US power and interests by extension the war
to the North — where there were foreign embassies, Russian ships in
Haiphong harbor, a Chinese railroad passing through North Vietnam, a
powerful air defense system, and so on. The destruction of SVN, the main
target throughout, passed with much less protest, and was regarded as
relatively costless. The government recognized this. To take one example,
internal records reveal that the bombing of NVN was meticulously planned,
because of the feared costs. In contrast, there was only scanty attention to
the far more intense bombing of SVN, which was already disastrous in 1965
when it was sharply escalated, and by 1967 led the most respected Vietnam
specialist and military analyst, Bernard Fall (no dove), to wonder whether
the society would even survive as a cultural and historical entity under the
US assault.Quite unlike Vietnam, there were massive protests against the invasion of
Iraq even before it was officially undertaken, and opposition has continued
high, much higher than during corresponding stages of the US invasion of
SVN.Turning to what was at stake, the pretexts concocted for the wars in
Indochina were colossal: preventing the Sino-Soviet conspiracy from
conquering the world. The near-lunacy of US planners, from the “wise men” of
the Truman administration through the Eisenhower years and the “best and the
brightest” of Camelot, was quite extraordinary, particularly with regard to
the images they concocted of China, shifting as circumstances required.
Though a lot had been known, the first major study of the National Security
World in those years only recently appeared: James Peck’s Washington’s
China. I haven’t come across reviews. It is highly revealing.There were, of course, also saner elements in planning circles. They
recognized that real interests were at stake, though not a “Slavic
Manchukuo” (Dean Rusk) or “revolutionary China” as part of the “monolithic
and ruthless conspiracy” to control the world (JFK), etc. The internal
records reveal the usual concern about the rational version of the domino
theory — quite distinct from the fevered version served up to the public,
but so rational that it is consistently invoked in internal planning
records. The plausible fear in this case was that an independent Vietnam
might pursue a path of independent development in a manner that would
inspire others in the region. It might be a “virus spreading contagion,” in
Kissinger’s rhetoric (about Allende), perhaps as far as resource-rich
Indonesia. That might lead Japan to “accommodate” to an independent
Southeast and East Asia as its industrial and technological center,
reconstructing Japan’s New Order outside US control (Kennan and other
planners considered that to be fine as long as it was under US control).
That would mean that the US had effectively lost the Pacific phase of World
War II. The natural reaction was to destroy the virus and inoculate those
who might succumb, by establishing vicious dictatorships. That goal was
achieved, with great success. That is why National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy later reflected that the US might well have cut back its war effort by
1965, after the Suharto coup in Indonesia, which aroused unconstrained
euphoria after he slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed the
only mass-based political organization, and opened the country to Western
plunder.Without continuing, the real stakes were significant, and the US victory was
not insubstantial; and the concocted pretexts, apparently believed, were not
just significant but colossal. The stakes in Iraq are enormous too, but it
is not at all clear that they exceed those perceived in Indochina. And they
are very different in character. Despite some inflated rhetoric from
Eisenhower and others, Vietnamese resources were of limited interest, while
in Iraq they are an overriding concern. The US could achieve its major war
aims in Vietnam simply by destroying it; not in Iraq, which has to be
controlled, not destroyed. And while there was concern over the “virus”
effect in Vietnam, that was never a consideration in Iraq.Looking more closely at the anti-war movements in both cases, I think, as
noted, that it has actually been greater in the case of Iraq than it was
during any comparable state of the Indochina wars. Furthermore, this country
has significantly changed as a result of 60s activism and its aftermath. The
movement against the war in Vietnam, when it finally developed, was not
“diluted” by the wide-ranging concerns of activists today. I can easily
elaborate even keeping to my own experience. Consider just talks. In the
late 1960s almost all requests were about the Vietnam war. Today, only a
fraction are about the Iraq war, not because the war is not a concern, but
because there are so many other live and important concerns. Furthermore the
deluge of invitations is far greater in scale, on all sorts of issues that
were scarcely discussed 40 years ago, and audiences are far larger and much
more engaged. And there are many other factors detracting from activism,
such as the enormous amount of energy drained away by the “9/11 Truth
Movement.” There may be an impression of less anti-war activism today than
in Vietnam, but I think it is quite misleading — even though protest
against the war in Iraq is far less than the crimes merit.5. What policies are available to the U.S. warmakers, now? What options are
plausible as what they would like to do, if they could have their way? Is
withdrawal in the cards? Will withdrawal lead to even worse civil war? Will
withdrawal lead to the victory of either Baathists or Islamic
fundamentalists? What would be the effect of either? If there is no
withdrawal now, forced by opposition or sought by some elites, or both, what
do you think policy will be?One policy available to US planners is to accept the responsibilities of
aggressors generally: to pay massive reparations for their crimes — not
aid, but reparations — and to attend to the will of the victims. But such
thoughts are beyond consideration, or commentary, in societies with a deeply
rooted imperial mentality and a highly indoctrinated intellectual class.The government, and commentators, know quite a lot about the will of the
victims, from regular polls run by the US and Western polling agencies. The
results are quite consistent. By now, about 2/3 of Baghdadis want US forces
to withdraw immediately, and about 70% of all Iraqis want a firm timetable
for withdrawal, mostly within a year or less: that means far higher
percentages in Arab Iraq, where the troops are actually deployed. 80%
(including Kurdish areas) believe that the US presence increases violence,
and almost the same percentage believe that the US intends to keep permanent
military bases. These numbers have been regularly increasing.As is the norm, Iraqi opinion is almost entirely disregarded. Current plans
are to increase the US force level in Baghdad, where the large majority of
the population wants them out. The Baker-Hamilton report did not even
mention Iraqi opinions on withdrawal. Not that they lacked the information;
they cited the very same polls on matters of concern to Washington,
specifically, support for attacks on US soldiers (considered legitimate by
60% of Iraqis), leading to policy recommendations for change of tactics.
Similarly, US opinion is of little interest, not only about Iraq, but also
about the next looming crisis, Iran. 75% of Americans (including 56% of
Republicans) favor pursuing better relations with Iran rather than threats.
That fact scarcely enters into policy considerations or commentary, just as
policy is not affected by the large majorities that favor diplomatic
relations with Cuba. Elite opinion is profoundly undemocratic, though
overflowing with lofty rhetoric about love of democracy and messianic
missions to promote democracy. There is nothing new or surprising about
that, and of course it is not limited to the US.As to the consequences of a US withdrawal, we are entitled to have our
personal judgments, all of them as uninformed and dubious as those of US
intelligence. But they do not matter. What matters is what Iraqis think. Or
rather, that is what should matter, and we learn a lot about the character
and moral level of the reigning intellectual culture from the fact that the
question of what the victims want barely even arises.6. What do you see as the likely consequences of various policy proposals
that have been put forward:(a) the Baker-Hamilton committee recommendations;
(b) the Peter Galbraith-Biden-Gelb proposal to divide Iraq into three
separate countries.The Baker-Hamilton recommendations are in part just a wish list: wouldn’t it
be nice if Iran and Syria would help us out? Every recommendation is so
hedged as to be almost meaningless. Thus, combat troops should be reduced,
unless they are needed to protect Americans soldiers — for example, those
embedded in Iraqi units, where many regard them as legitimate targets of
attack. Buried in the report are the expected recommendations to allow
corporate (meaning mostly US-UK) control over energy resources. These are
left undiscussed, perhaps regarded as inappropriate to bring to public
attention. There are a few words recommending that the President announce
that we do not intend a permanent military presence, but without a call to
terminate construction. Much the same throughout. The report dismisses
partition proposals, even the more limited proposals for a high level of
independence within a loosely federal structure. Though it’s not really our
business, or our right to decide, their skepticism is probably warranted.
Neighboring countries would be very hostile to an independent Kurdistan,
which is landlocked, and Turkey might even invade, which would also threaten
the long-standing and critical US-Turkey-Israel alliance. Kurds strongly
favor independence, but appear to regard it as not feasible — for now, at
least. The Sunni states might invade to protect the Sunni areas, which lack
resources. The Shia region might improve ties with Iran. It could set off a
regional war. My own view is that federal arrangements make good sense, not
only in Iraq. But these do not seem realistic prospects for the near-term
future.7. In contrast, what do you think policy should be? Suppose sincere concern
for real democracy, sincere concern for populations in need, sincere concern
for law and justice were to suddenly gain a hold on decision making, or
suppose the will of an antiwar opposition could dictate terms, what should
U.S. policymakers be forced to do?The answer seems to me pretty straightforward. Policy should be that of all
aggressors:(1) pay reparations;
(2) attend to the will of the victims;
(3) hold the guilty parties accountable, in accord with the Nuremberg
principles, the UN Charter, and other international instruments, even the US
War Crimes Act before it was eviscerated by the Military Commisions Act, one
of the most shameful pieces of legislation in American history. There are no
mechanical principles in human affairs, but these are sensible guidelines. A
more practical proposal is to work to change the domestic society and
culture substantially enough so that what should be done can at least become
a topic for discussion. That is a large task, not only on this issue, though
I think elite opposition is far more ferocious than that of the general
public.