10.14.08

The Eonic Effect: decline and fall theories

Posted in History, The Eonic Effect at 9:01 pm by nemo

There have been a whole series of ‘decline and fall’ perceptions of late, including an hilarious Maureen Dowd op ed in Latin. One of the most interesting is that of Chalmers Johnson in his book Nemesis, which I reviewed at Amazon.com here.

Issues of the decline and fall of civilizations are very tricky, and generally produce false analogies, e.g. the Roman analogy. The first question is, what civilization are we talking about? Usually, of late, it is ‘The American Empire’. But this isn’t a civilization analogous in period to Rome’s late decline. In general, the comparison of some modern decline to last phases of the Roman Empire is spurious, and doesn’t work.
However, Chalmers Johnson’s analysis didn’t fall into that trap, because his comparison was to the Republic of Rome, not its later empire. That’s starting to get it right, check out my review.

The best perspective is that of the eonic effect, whose master sequence looks at the three great transitions of world history, clocked by the early onset of higher civilization in Sumer/Egypt, the Axial boundary, and the rise of the modern world via the modern transition, ca. 1500 to 1800, with a Great Divide, therefore ca. 1800. This divide shows a curious system property, as a system switches from macro to micro. Check the material on this. The macro gives you a free ride, so to speak, with the micro you are on your own.
All forms of ‘decline’ for our time are therefore clocked relative to ca 1800, according to a standard of values to judge that decline. Furthermore, we must adopt the perspective of the eonic model in terms of its trigger zones that generate the modern transition, which begins thence to globalize, non-trigger zones might still maintain the transition as the trigger zones ‘decline’ or fall off during globalization. Therefore, we must distinguish decline in the trigger zones and the rise and possible future decline of the global system, hardly able to decline since it hasn’t come into existence yet! The point: modernity (postmodern ideas are a muddle and aren’t useful for this analysis) is a function of ultimate globalization and can hardly decline before its rise is complete!

Much criticism of the North American system is pointing to the ‘decline of the American Empire’. But is that the right decline?
The standard of judgment is from 1800, by the standard of democracy, say. Then decline began with the rise of an ‘American Empire’ in the nineteenth century, and the loss of that Empire is not decline but a possible recovery!
In fact, in terms of our model, ‘decline’ might start at once, in the sense of ‘deviation’ from initial conditions. The US was always prone to empire by its nature, and the context of its expansion. But roughly speaking our overall analysis works.
Thus the loss of American democracy would token true decline, by the standard measured from the Great Divide, ca. 1800. You won’t get a second free ride to restore initial conditions, it’s up to you to do it.

This can at first be confusing, because the eonic model doesn’t deal in civilizations, but in transitional periods, i.e. using differential periodization, and differential trigger zones. The question of American civilization and its decline is not the issue. The first issue of the general globalization, and its fate. The other key issue is the differential interval 1500 to 1800 in the (differential) trigger zones (viz. those described in the eonic model, the German, Dutch, French, English, etc…, time-zone-slices 1500 to 1800) Note that the American system was not quite a trigger zone, but surely its first born, half way between the trigger interval and the field of globalization. American was the first great success story in the globalization following the modern transition, with its English trigger. Note that it was a colonial revolt. But will its success coopt the proper realization of globalized modernity? We seem to be in the phase of ‘colonial’ revolts against the decline of the American system into imperialism, as this corrupts the meaning of democracy and goes into reversal.
But the future is unclear, and not fixed by deterministic laws. The system could recover.

We should with thorough consternation note one thing: in the ancient instance, clocking decline from -600 Athenian democracy lasted two centuries (actually, Solonic Athens wasn’t yet democracy, but roughly speaking this works). Although comparison is likely to be misleading the eonic model does allow comparison of the two century interval -600 to -400 (as in the Greek case) and 1800 to 2000.
The model thus suggests (but doesn’t prove, and doesn’t allow such conclusions as formal deductions) that two centuries aftetr 1800 democracy is going to have a sudden deviation point, again with no implication of deterministic inevitability, the model says nothing about two centuries, it could be coincidence. It is merely a rough average measuring some onset of chaotification.

If you follow this so far, it is clear that current events have in fact followed the eonic model very closely. It’s not clear if that is coincidence.
Two centuries to the year from 1800, and this is spooky, an accelerated chaotification occurs and we are all of sudden wondering if democracy will persist.
The answer is that the model makes no deterministic predictions and completely allows intentional interventions to restore the foundations of democracy, subject only to the constraints of our own ineptitude.

So we can see that the declinists, while they are confused by the Roman analogy, are nonetheless feeling a sense of dread as they sense the possible chaotification of American democracy. Its loss would be a calamity for the world system. But wait, is it a democracy, or an imperialism coopting the balanced globalization of its grandchildren?

It is worth repeating again that decline in this perspective is measured relative to 1800, and checks the health of democracy, thus, decline is really starting with the rise of American imperialism, not the other way around. It is important to consider this issue, since American ‘democracy’ has deviated from its initial conditions in a state that is hard to assess. Can we have democracy if it is secretly controlled by the CIA? The CIA is a phantom relative to 1800, when it didn’t exist. Could we go back to the starting conditions and abolish the CIA? Look at all these ‘deviations from initial conditions’ and consider what the chances are for maintaining democracy (assuming we ever had it! A marxist wouldn’t quite see ‘bougeois democracy’ as true democracy).

It thus seems indicated that maintaining American democracy is critical, but this is rendered ambiguous in the context of ‘imperialism’ and the context of globalization.

The only contribution to this America can make is that of democracy. Its decline into imperialism deprives it of that task, and threatens its destruction.

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