09.27.11
Venezuela’s Social-Based Democratic Model
Venezuela’s Social-Based Democratic Model: Innovations and Limitations
Sep 26th 2011, by Steve Ellner
The brand of socialism that has emerged in Venezuela under the presidency of Hugo Chávez differs in fundamental ways from orthodox Marxism and past socialist experiences in large part because of its emphasis on social as opposed to economic objectives. In addition, in contrast to leftist doctrines associated with really existing socialism, the Venezuelan government’s social policies appeal to the non-wealthy in general but prioritize the needs of the non-proletariat, underprivileged sectors of the population, specifically workers in the informal economy, those employed in small non-unionized firms in the formal economy and the rural work force. The Chávez government has placed a premium on the incorporation of these excluded and semi-excluded groups[1] into the political, economic and cultural life of the nation and their participation in decision making, particularly in the local arena. The following article uses the term “social-based democracy” to refer to the Chavista strategy of promoting incorporation on a massive scale in a way that is designed to enhance the legitimacy of a government whose democratic credentials have been consistently questioned by its adversaries.
An underlining assumption accepted by much of the Chavista movement is that the non-incorporated, non-privileged sectors in Venezuela have a high level of political awareness but lack the experience, organizational skills, and discipline to play a protagonist role in the process of radical transformation. Chavista leaders and activists, for instance, attribute the failures of a significant number of cooperatives and community councils to the lack of preparation of their members. In an attempt to stimulate interest and enthusiasm for social programs such as cooperatives and community councils, the government, in effect, jumpstarted them by injecting large sums of money facilitated by exceptionally high oil prices into rudimentary structures. The institutional flexibility and leeway and lack of strict controls over massive allocations for these programs are designed to encourage the participation of those who have been traditionally apathetic and skeptical and imbued with a sense of powerlessness.
full: http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6519