Darwiniana

History, Evolution, and The Darwin Debate

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Will, free will, and representation vs thing in itself

February 24th, 2014 · No Comments

The previous two posts explore the ‘free will divide’. Coyne may be right to challenge ‘reason’ as a substitute for ‘free will’. In any case, I find it hard to finish reading such articles because I feel their assumptions are wrong, viz. darwinian axioms and reductionist scientism at the helm. As before in many posts, I suggest considering the realm of Kantian ethics. But that realm is itself confusing and not conclusive. One problem there is the way the famous ‘Groundwork’, a classic for sure, is strangely confusing and the wrong way to start. The overall history of the question of Kantian ethics over time is more useful.
Beyond that is the simplification of ‘transcendental idealism’ created by Schopenhauer, and there we appear to get the independent category of ‘will’ outside of realm of causality. That seems to indicate the possible realm of the right explanation. But transcendental idealism is beyond the possibility of consideration for current science, and has a few bloopers that suggest it is an incomplete subject (e.g. how could the history of cosmos since the Big Bang come into existence as ‘my’ representation?? That’s a severe blooper, but the formulation resembles the physics discussions of the place of observers in cosmology)
Nonetheless the independent category of ‘will’ (and we have explored J. G. Bennett’s related formulation of ‘being, function, will’ to replace the material/spiritua/ or material/conscious/alive confusions) as a foundation solves the problem of ‘free will’, even as it tends to make it marginal. But we can begin to say that the ‘will’, free or not, is not a part of the space-time matrix. Its action might create a ‘decision’ manifesting in space-time, and the brain, as a causal sequence called a ‘decision’. That Kantian approach is the only one that seems to come close to a real answer.

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