Hegel’s views on history, and the intuition as to history’s hidden ‘logic’, as cited also in Zizek’s commentary (see previous post for link), are very classic: but I think they are not correct. The logic of history is something quite different, and I think that the attempt to demonstrate a progression transcending pairs of opposites has not been demonstrated in any meaningful way. The overall process is much different.
I recommend those who are stuck on this point (which I can’t disprove, I can’t find a single example in fact) to read WHEE, online at history-and-evolution.com. The dynamic proposed there is far superior to Hegel’s speculative hypothesis. The logic of history is a mysterious but demonstrable sequence of ‘macroevolutionary’ transitions whose action is is not the purely mechanical, but the play of ideas along with ‘materials’. Perhaps this was what Hegel was looking for. His view of history was a response to Kant’s classic on history. I cite this essay and try to show that the ‘pattern’ of history he asked for is represented in the pattern exposed by my method. Many other issues are involved here, but I think that Hegel’s attempt to answer Kant was premature and too speculative.
The method of World History and the Eonic Effect (WHEE) is far superior and far more concrete: it touches theory but bypasses it with a system demonstration of a complex dynamic at work. In the logic of directional transitions we see a mystery of design, but it is not a process of dialectic. The simpler core of idealism is not that history can process dialectic or metalogic, but that it can evolve very ‘logically’ in the simplest sense.
In Last and First Men I tried to show how a more practical approach to world history and economics could found itself in the solution to Kant’s challenge to debrief the hidden dynamic or pattern of world history.
It would be nice if someone in the cloudcuckoo land of marxism and its Zizekian dialecticians could consider this material.
Hegel is commonly associated with the idea that history has an inherent logic in which ideas are embodied in practice and then left behind in a dialectical process in which they are transcended by their opposites. Drawing on the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, Žižek radicalizes this idea of dialectic to mean the rejection of the logical principle of noncontradiction, so that rather than seeing rationality at work in history, Hegel rejects reason itself as it has been understood in the past. Implicit in Hegel (according to Žižek) is a new kind of “paraconsistent logic” in which a proposition “is not really suppressed by its negation.”